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PROBLEMS OF PLEUADINC,
PROOF AND PERSUASION IN
A REAPPORTIONMENT CASE
Alfred L. Scanlan*
EXPLANATORY COMMENT
In the year which has elapsed since the Supreme Court's. monumental
decision in Baker v. Carr,' a constitutional ferment of the greatest dimensions
has ensued. As the victorious attorney of Baker v. Carr perceptively obperves,
"By every yardstick of measurement, this historic landmark decision has had
the greatest effect on state governments of any event since our Federal Con-
stitution was adopted."2
By a recent count, cases challenging legislative apportionments had been
filed in 36 states, and 25 decisions had been handed down. In 19 of these
decisions, the existing apportionment of one or both bodies of the legislature
have been found to be unconstitutional. New reapportionment measures have
been passed in 15 states and are expected in the near future in 11 more.3
The Supreme Court recently noted jurisdiction in eight cases involving either
reapportionment of state legislatures or congressional redistricting.4 In addition,
the Court already has struck down, by a vote of 8 to 1, the invidious unit rule
system observed for so long in primary elections in Georgia.'
Many talented and dedicated people have played a part in this battle for
constitutional reform, or, if you prefer, revolt. Political scientists and professors
of government and public administration have furnished underlying theory
* Member of the law firm of Shea & Gardner, Washington, D.C., and member of the
bars of the District of Columbia, Maryland and Indiana, and of the Supreme Court of the
United States. Counsel for plaintiffs in Maryland Comm. for Fair Representation v. Tawes.
1 369 U.S. 186 (1961).
2 Rhyne, One Year's Record In Reapportionment Results, address delivered before the
New Jersey Institute of Municipal Attorneys, Newark, N.J., March 16, 1963, p. 1.
3 Washington Evening Star, March 24, 1963, p. B-3; Washington Post & Times Herald,
March 24, 1963, p. C-i. The National Municipal League compiles a monthly list of cases on
reapportionment which, plus the League's several other publications on reapportionment, are
useful in keeping track of recent developments.
4 WMCA, Inc. v. Simon, prob. juris. noted, 31 U.S.L. WEEK 3404 (U.S. June 10, 1963)
(No. 460) (N.Y.); Wesberry v. Vandiver, prob. juris. noted, 31 U.S.L. WE.EK 3404 (U.S. June
10, 1963) (No. 507) (Ga.); Reynolds v. Sims, prob. juris. noted, 31 U.S.L. WEEK 3404 (U.S.
June 10, 1963) (No. 508) (Ala.); Vann v. Frink, prob. juris. noted, 31 U.S.L. WEEK 3404
(U.S. June 10, 1963) (No. 540) (Ala.); Maryland Committee for Fair Representation v.
Tawes, prob. juris. noted, 31 U.S.L. WEEK 3404 (U.S. June 10, 1963) (No. 554) (Md.);
McConnell v. Frink, prob. juris. noted, 31 U.S.L. WEEK 3404 (U.S. June 10, 1963) (No. 610)
(Ala.); Davis v. Mann, prob. juris. noted, 31 U.S.L. WEEK 3404 (U.S. June 10, 1963) (No.
797) (Va.); Wright v. Rockefeller, prob. juris. noted, 31 U.S.L. WEEK 3404 (U.S. June 10,
1963) (No. 950) (N.Y.). The three Alabama cases, Nos. 508, 540 and 610, have been con-
solidated for argument before the Court. 31 U.S.L. WEEK 3407 (U.S. June 10, 1963).
The Court also has before it a petition for certiorari in the Michigan reapportionment case,
Beadle v. Scholle, petition for cert. filed, 31 U.S.L. WEEK 3147 (U.S. Oct. 15, 1962) (No. 517).
5 Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368 (1963), affirming the result but not the decree, Sanders
v. Gray, 203 F. Supp. 158 (N.D. Ga. 1962). The equally archaic Maryland unit rule statute
has been declared unconstitutional by an uncontested order of a three-judge court for the
District of Maryland; the order also permanently enjoined the state election officials from cer-
tifying as successful nominees candidates for the office of Governor, U.S. Senator, and other
state-wide offices, who do not receive a plurality of the votes cast in the primary election.
Baltimore Morning Sun, May 11, 1963, p. 30.
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and plentiful statistics. The League of Women Voters, the AFL-CIO, and
local Chambers of Commerce have helped furnish funds. Politicians, at least
those favorably disposed toward reasonable apportionment, have contributed
their native gifts of leadership, direction and productive political compromise.
The courts, of course, have provided indispensable stimulae toward necessary
legislative action. In so doing, the judiciary, at last, has given "meaning to
the otherwise sterile insistence of Mr. Justice Frankfurter that relief from
inequitable apportionment 'must come through an aroused popular conscience
that sears the conscience of the people's representatives.' "6
However, the lawyer has proved to be the infantryman of this war. The
late Robert Jackson once remarked that America believes in "government by
law suit." Sooner or later, practically all of the great public issues which
confront the nation find their way to the courts in one form or another. This
has been especially true of the reapportionment controversy. The basic issue is
whether representative government is to prevail in the legislative chambers of
the states and in the House of Representatives of the United States. More
precisely, the question presented is whether there is anything in the fourteenth
amendment that guarantees that the fundamental principles of representative
government and majority rule shall obtain in the country's legislative bodies.
Thus are raised constitutional issues of the greatest magnitude, enormous impact,
and far-reaching effect. Under the circumstances, it is not surprising that it has
been the lawyer who has been called upon to furnish the technical advocacy
so indispensable to the presentation and resolution of the grave and complex
constitutional questions with which the country, the states, and now the courts,
are wrestling.
My purpose here is to describe the anatomy of a reapportionment case as
seen through the eyes of a lawyer who is called upon to prepare, try and
argue it.' From pleadings through proof, a number of problems, some unique,
some familiar, are encountered by the attorney who handles a reapportionment
or a redistricting case.
BRINGING THE ACTION
1. Where to Sue
At the outset the reapportionment advocate must determine, if the choice
is open, whether to bring suit in a federal or a state court. If there is an express
remedy provided by the state's constitution, or in its statutes, perhaps the better
course is to institute the litigation in the state court. For example, in Asbury
Park Press, Inc. v. Woolley,' a case decided two years before Baker v. Carr, the
New Jersey Supreme Court sustained a claim that the New Jersey Assembly
was malapportioned. The court relied on express provisions of the New Jersey
6 Sindler, Baker v. Carr: How to Sear the Conscience of Legislators, 72 YALE L.J. 23,
38 (1962).
7 For a discussion of the constitutional issues involved, compare Professor Dixon's prefer-
ence for the due process provision over the equal protection clause as the basis for arguing
most effectively against unfair representation, with Professor Hanson's leanings toward equal
protection as the standard to be applied. Dixon, Apportionment Standards and Judicial Power,
infra at 367, and Dixon, Legislative Apportionment and the Federal Constitution, 27 LAw
& CONTEMP. PROB. 329 (1962); Hanson, Courts in the Thicket, The Problem of Judicial
Standards in Apportionment Cases, 12 AM. U. L. REv. 51, 79 (1963).
8 33 N.J. 1, 161 A.2d 705 (1960).
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Constitution, even though it also indicated, without deciding the point, that
the malapportionment under attack violated the fourteenth amendment. More-
over, long before the Supreme Court's decision in Baker v. Carr, a number of
state courts had held apportionment statutes to be in violation of state law.'
As the Supreme Court of Oklahoma observed in Jones v. Freeman:0
It might be well to point out that in 1938, the courts of twenty-two
states had exercised the power, or had stated that they had the
power, to review legislative reapportionment acts upon [state] con-
stitutional grounds, and no court had denied that it possessed such
power.
It is perfectly clear also that fourteenth amendment issues can be raised
and decided in a state court, whether or not the complaining petitioners also
have valid state grounds on which to rest their reapportionment action.'" On
the other hand, it may still be contended that a state court would not be obliged
to decide the federal equal protection or due process questions in a reapportion-
ment case where, under state law, no remedy is available by which a decision
in favor of the complaining party could be enforced.' 2
On balance, the rapid and momentous events which have transpired since
Baker v. Carr strongly suggest that a three-judge federal court certainly is the
forum where the most expeditious decision may be obtained.' The decision
of such a court is directly appealable to the United States Supreme Court. 4
In addition, a federal judge may enjoy a slightly more independent status than
a state judge. To the extent that the practical compromises of politics may be
significant factors to be taken into judicial account in the resolution of apportion-
ment controversies, these would appear to be considerations less likely to move
an appointed judge than an elected judge.
However, there is at least one caveat about bringing a reapportionment
action in a federal court. The federal courts surely are not anxious to plunge
into the reapportionment controversy, despite the decision of the Supreme Court
in Baker v. Carr. Sound and deeply engrained instincts of judicial abstention
have led some federal courts to hold their hands until the highest court of a
state was given an opportunity to pass upon an apportionment law, especially
where the state constitution was germane to the issue. In Lein v. Sathre,5 a
three-judge federal court in North Dakota stayed the proceedings before it
in order to afford an opportunity for the Supreme Court of North Dakota
9 Some of the earlier cases are collected and referred to in Annot., 2 A.L.R. 1337 (1919).
10 193 Okla. 554, 146 P.2d 564, 570 (1943).
11 Md. Comm. for Fair Representation v. Tawes, 228 Md. 412, 180 A.2d 656 (1962);
Scholle v. Hare, 369 U.S. 429 (1962); Sweeney v. Notte, 183 A.2d 296 (R.I. 1962).
12 See Judge Henderson's dissenting opinion in Md. Comm. for Fair Representation v.
Tawes, supra note 11, at 676; see also, Kdd v. McCanless, 200 Tenn. 273, 292 S.W.2d 40
(1956), appeal dismissed, 352 U.S. 920 (1956), where the state law of remedies was upheld
by the Supreme Court's dismissal of the appeal.
13 See, e.g., Sanders v. Gray, 203 F. Supp. 158 (N.D. Ga. 1962) (striking down the
Georgia unit rule); Moss v. Burkhart, 207 F. Supp. 885 (W.D. Okla. 1962) (declaring the
existing apportionment of the Oklahoma Senate and House to be in violation of the equal
protection clause); and Toombs v. Fortson, 205 F. Supp. 248 (N.D. Ga. 1962) (declaring the
existing apportionment laws in Georgia to be unconstitutional, but giving the Georgia legisla-
ture another opportunity to rectify the constitutional defects before entering a final order).
14 28 U.S.C. § 1253 (1958).
15 201 F. Supp. 535 (D. N.D. 1962).
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to pass upon questions arising under the North Dakota reapportionment provi-
sions found in the State Constitution."0
2. When to Sue
Proper timing may be quite important. The apportionment advocate may
have to look sharply to avoid the dilemma represented by prematurity on the
one hand and mootness on the other. Elections for the state legislature occur at
regular intervals, and lawsuits take time. To avoid the hazard that injunctive
relief may be denied on the grounds that the action is too late and the requested
judicial interference with the electoral processes too severe, the safest course is
to institute the action as far in advance of the next state election as possible.'"
The universal rule is that a court will not pass upon a constitutional issue
in an action prematurely brought."8 Nevertheless, the apportionment cases
decided up to now indicate that the risk of prematurity is not a substantial one.
More usual has been the experience of those plaintiffs who have been told by
a court that they have a cause of action, but that relief will be withheld until
the legislature has had another opportunity to reapportion."
Disappointment at this type of delayed ruling is eased, however, when
the court, as it did in Lisco v. McNichols," makes it ominously clear that at
least a prima facie case of invidious discrimination has been established. The
strong implication that corrective court action may follow further legislative
inaction has induced the legislatures of Minnesota, New Jersey, Maryland,
Florida, Tennessee and Delaware, among others, to reapportion themselves at
the next general or special session following the entry of the court's interlocutory
decree retaining jurisdiction of the case.
Still, there is always the possibility that a reapportionment suit will be
rendered moot as the result of new legislation amending the existing statutes
or pertinent provisions of the state constitution. One cannot complain if the
legislative action which follows eliminates the constitutional violations against
voting rights against which the suit was brought. On the other hand, where
the new legislation still falls short of the minimum requirements of the fourteenth
amendment, the apportionment advocate may have a difficult decision to make.
In the Georgia unit rule case, for example, the legislature of Georgia amended
16 Contrast Lisco v. McNichols, 208 F. Supp. 471 (D. Colo. 1962), where a three-judge
court rejected an argument for federal abstention since the Colorado Supreme Court had post-
poned further hearing on the reapportionment case pending in that tribunal, with Remmey v.
Smith, 102 F. Supp. 708 (E.D. Pa. 1951), a pre-Baker case, where a federal court deferred
to the possibility of an available state remedy. The federal abstention argument was specifically
rejected in Mann v. Davis, 213 F. Supp. 577 (E.D. Va. 1962), and this is one of the questions
presented in the current appeal to the Supreme Court, 31 U.S.L. WEEK 3404 (U.S. June 10,
1963) (No. 797). See Dixon, Apportionment Standards and Judicial Power, inira at 367, 372.
17 For example, the Maryland reapportionment action was instituted in the Circuit Court
for Anne Arundel County on August 12, 1960, although the relief sought was directed at the
elections to be held in the fall of 1962. Even at that, the 'Circuit Court of Appeals did not
finally decide the question of representation in the State Senate until September 25, 1962. Md.
Comm. for Fair Representation v. Tawes, 229 Md. 406, 184 A.2d 715 (1962).
18 Postum Cereal Co. v. California Fig Nut Co., 272 U.S. 693 (1927).
19 See Baker v. Carr, on remand, 206 F. Supp. 341 (M.D. Tenn. 1962); Toombs v. Fort-
son, 205 F. Supp. 248 (N.D. Ga. 1962); Magraw v. Donovan, 177 F. Supp. 803 (D. Minn.
1958) ; In re Legislative Reapportionment, 374 P.2d 66 (Colo. 1962).
20 208 F. Supp. 471 (D. Colo. 1962).
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the statutes attacked by the complaint, on the same day that the case was heard
before the three-judge court. However, the plaintiff was allowed to amend his
complaint so as to challenge the amended act which still fell far short of the
"one man, one vote" principle ultimately upheld by the Supreme Court of the
United States.
The Maryland experience was somewhat different. The day after the
Chancellor had declared existing provisions of the Maryland Constitution with
respect to the representation provided in the House of Delegates to be in violation
of the fourteenth amendment, a special session of the Maryland General As-
sembly was convened.2 Five days later, the special session adjourned after
having enacted stopgap apportionment legislation which increased the member-
ship of the House of Delegates from 123 to 142 and allotted the 19 new delegates
to the suburban and urban areas.2 Since the trial court had withheld ruling
on the issue of the apportionment of the State Senate, the Maryland legislature
naturally did nothing about that. The petitioners, therefore, had to choose be-
tween starting over with a new complaint, or appealing on a basis which
eliminated a claim that the House of Delegates, as such, was unconstitutionally
apportioned. The latter course was chosen.2"
The question of mootness appears to have arisen in the Michigan case
now pending in the Supreme Court as Beadle v. Scholle.24 The question of the
constitutionality of the representation provided in the Michigan Senate is the
sole issue. On April 1, 1963, the people of Michigan in a state-wide referendum,
by a very narrow margin adopted a new state constitution which provides a
different and slightly improved basis for representation in the state senate.2 5
A case or controversy ends if the statute or constitutional provision which is
the basis for the action or the conduct complained of is repealed or modified. 3
3. Who Should Sue
The problem of who are proper plaintiffs in a reapportionment action is
not significant. Indeed, the advocate's problem here seems primarily to dis-
courage, as diplomatically as possible, some of the ambitious young office seekers
who want to have their names emblazoned not only in the judicial reports but
in the public press as trail blazers in the vindication of fundamental voting
rights. The standing to sue possessed by a voter whose vote is diluted or dis-
21 Washington Evening Star, May 25, 1962, p. A-1.
22 Baltimore Mornng Sun, June 1, 1962, p. 1; MD. ANN. CODE art. 40, § 42(a) (Supp.
1962).
23 Md. Comm. for Fair Representation v. Tawes, 229 Md. 406, 184 A.2d 715 (1962).
However, part of the disadvantage, we believe, was eliminated by attacking on appeal, not only
the representation in the Maryland State Senate, but also the representation provided in the
General Assembly as a whole.
24 Petition for cert. filed, 31 U.S.L. WEEK 3147 (U.S. Oct. 15, 1962) (No. 517).
25 Washington Evening Star, April 2, 1963, p. A-1.
26 Natural Milk Producers Ass'n v. San Francisco, 317 U.S. 423 (1942); Berry v. Davis,
242 U.S. 468 (1917). Though not wishing to prejudice any pending cases, it is not unlikely
that the result of the state referendum has rendered the Michigan case moot. United States
v. Alaska S.S. Co., 253 U.S. 113 (1920).
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criminated against has long been established;2" it is settled now, so far as re-
apportionment actions are concerned, by Baker v. Carr.
Plaintiffs in reapportionment cases may be residents,"8 taxpayers,29 or
voters.2 " The obvious course, then, is to secure plaintiffs who possess all of
these characteristics. Moreover, since at least the due process argument against
gross malapportionment finds a partial basis in a showing of discriminatory
taxation against the taxpayers of the more populous and underrepresented
areas, it is provident to see to it that the plaintiffs are taxpayers in good standing
from those areas, in addition to their being qualified voters.2 '
Moreover, if one of the plaintiffs happens to be an association, as was true
in the Maryland suit, or a radio station, as was the case in New York, WMCA,
Inc. v. Simon," individual plaintiffs should be joined since associations and
radio stations obviously are not voters."
4. Whom to Sue
Generally, the proper defendants in a reapportionment suit are the state
officials who have the duty, either under the statutes or the state constitution,
to conduct the elections. It is axiomatic that an official who acts under the
color of an unconstitutional provision of a state statute or constitution is acting
ultra vires, and his actions may be enjoined.' 4 For example, in Gray v. Sanders,
the Georgia unit rule case, the Chairman and the Secretary of the Georgia State
Democratic Executive Committee properly were named as two of the defendants
since, under the statute, they performed certain administrative functions in the
conduct of the primary elections. Generally, a declaratory judgment that the
election laws or the statutes providing representation in the legislature violate
the fourteenth amendment should be sought in a reapportionment action, plus
such injunctive relief as is necessary to insure that the election officials will not
conduct the election on the basis of the illegal laws.
5. How Long to Wait for the Legislature To Do Nothing
Despite the outpouring of litigation following the Supreme Court's decision
in Baker v. Carr, it is apparent that the courts, state and federal, remain dis-
inclined to act in a reapportionment case if there is any reasonable possibility
27 Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944). Indeed, a voter's standing to sue was settled
at common law over 260 years ago. Ashby v. White, 2 Ld. Raym. 938, 92 Eng. Rep. 126 (K.B.
1703).
28 Magraw v. Donovan, 159 F. Supp. 901 (D. Minn. 1958).
29 Asbury Park Press, Inc. v. Woolley, 33 N.J. 1, 161 A.2d 705 (1960).
30 Dyer v. Kazuhisa Abe, 138 F. Supp. 220 (D. Hawaii 1956).
31 Concerning questions of standing, see Dixon, Apportionment Standards and Judicial
Power, infra at 367, 371.
32 208 F. Supp. 368 (S.D.N.Y. 1962).
33 For example, in Maryland it is established that a corporation or association does not
have standing in its own name to complain of legislative action which affects the rights of its
members. Md. Naturopathic Ass'n v. Klorman, 191 Md. 626, 62 A.2d 538 (1948). For this
reason, The Maryland Committee for Fair Representation may be the first plaintiff named in
the complaint, but certainly it was not the only one. Ten other individuals, all voters, taxpayers
and residents of the underrepresented urban and suburban areas, were carefully selected as
party plaintiffs.
34 Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 16 (1958).
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that the legislature will do something about the situation."5 Nevertheless, courts
are not blind to the political facts of life; they will not ignore what "all others
can see and understand." 6 There comes a time, and the courts will recognize it,
however reluctantly on the part of some, when it is manifest that "it would be
idle and futile to... [seek relief from malapportionment through] the voluntary
action of the body that made it.""7
Accordingly, the petition ought to contain allegations which demonstrate,
or at least recite, any extended history of legislative inaction in the premises.
In Baker v. Carr, this was achieved through an affidavit by the Mayor of Nash-
ville, Tennessee, which contained the history of the failure of the Tennessee
legislature, from 1901 through 1960, to reapportion as required by the state
constitution."8
In Maryland Committee for Fair Representation v. Tawes, plaintiffs stated
the history of continuing and increasing malapportionment in Maryland as part
of the allegations of the bill of complaint. The Legislative Reference Service of
the Maryland General Assembly was most cooperative in supplying the dates,
numbers, and the disposition of bills that had been introduced over the years
in vain attempts to secure some reapportionment of the legislature. The Governor
of Maryland also unknowingly cooperated by stating to the press (quite accu-
rately) that any proposed reapportionment legislation whereby representation
might be reasonably related to population would be "in the realm of the im-
possible."3 9 In addition, some of the more plain-talking rural legislators supplied
further evidence of determined legislative inaction for inclusion in the complaint,
and later in the briefs, by their candid acknowledgments of their unyielding
opposition to reasonable reapportionment, lest they thereby be denied the
privilege of continuing minority rule in the Maryland General Assembly. 0
If possible, then, the allegations of the complaint or petition should spell
out to the fullest extent the past history of legislative inaction. The reapportion-
ment advocate should emphasize at the outset, and at all stages of his case, the
demonstrable futility of seeking legislative relief prior to an authoritative and
compelling ruling by a court of competent jurisdiction. Even the most timid
of judges will acknowledge that the law does not require the performance of a
futile gesture as a condition to resort to the courts.
35 See, e.g., Sweeney v. Notte, 183 A.2d 296 (R.I. 1962), where the Supreme Court of
Rhode Island, in declaring the Rhode Island House of Representatives to be constituted in a
manner violating the fourteenth amendment, nevertheless denied final relief, observing that
they were not persuaded that their obligation to resolve the justiciable issues in the case was:
so broad as to require us to hold that the superior court would be warranted
in supervising reapportionment to the house of representatives, in the un-
likely event that the general assembly should fail to do so. Such a declara-
tion would be in the nature of mandamus by duress. In the light of the
exclusive prerogative of the general assembly to apportion the membership
of the house, we will respect the co-ordinate relationship existing between us.
36 Child Labor Tax Case, 259 U.S. 20, 37 (1922).
37 State v. Cunningham, 81 Wis. 440, 483, 51 N.W. 724 (1892).
38 369 U.S. 186, 191 & n.10 (1961).
39 Washington Post & Times Herald, Oct. 5, 1960, p. B-2.
40 Washington Evening Star, March 3, 1960, p. B-i; Baltimore Morning Sun, Dec. 12,
1950, p. 6. See also Tabor, The Gerrymandering of State and Federal Legislative Districts, 16
MD. L. REv. 277, 283 & n.29 (1956).
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PROVING THE CASE
1. How Extensive a Hearing
Despite Baker v. Carr, it is still possible that the allegations of a reapportion-
ment petition or complaint will be met by demurrer or a motion to dismiss. The
grounds might be that the complaint on its face shows that a court of equity
should abstain from granting relief in the circumstances disclosed. Justice Rut-
ledge's concurring opinion in Colegrove v. Green,"' could prove to have more
enduring vitality than the Frankfurter majority opinion, now superseded by
Baker v. Carr. Want of equity jurisdiction, unlike lack of jurisdiction over the
subject matter, does not go to the power of a court - only to the question of
whether it should, not whether it can, afford injunctive relief.42
The lingering possibility of judicial abstention despite jurisdiction to act,
suggests the importance of filing a fairly detailed "Brandeis-type" complaint.
Nothing is lost by making the original bill a comprehensive document. If the
case goes up to the highest court of the state, or to the Supreme Court of the
United States, the record, in the main, is the one created through the draftsman-
ship of plaintiff's counsel. For example, the petition filed in the Maryland case,
including eight exhibits attached thereto, occupied 43 of the 59-page printed
record on which the case was reviewed by the Maryland Court of Appeals.
A more critical question, although not entirely the decision of plaintiff's
counsel to resolve, is whether or not, following the defendant's answer, the
plaintiffs should seek a full hearing or elect to proceed by summary judgment.
His nonpaying clients are apt to urge a full hearing in order to secure the
maximum advantages of publicity which they imagine will be gained thereby.
If he follows his instinct for the least work the better, the advocate will choose
summary judgment; moreover, summary judgment has real advantages. For
instance, the three-judge federal court before which a full hearing was held in
WMCA, Inc. v. Simon was very sticky about admitting into evidence certain
proof offered by the plaintiffs. Plaintiffs were not allowed to present evidence
to prove that existing apportionment represented an intentional discrimination
against the residents of New York City and the surrounding area, and that as
a result the citizens of the urban areas were subjected to substantial discrimina-
tion with respect to the allocation of tax revenues and distribution of state aid,
as well as in other matters affecting the economic, social and political welfare
of the state.43 The New York petitioners also were unsuccessful in an effort to
have the court admit into evidence a consensus of scholarly opinion in support
of the view that the only legitimate basis of representation in a state legislature
is population. " These difficulties very likely could have been circumvented by
use of the summary judgment procedure. One comprehensive affidavit, or
several, with the pertinent appendices attached, could have placed before the
41 328 U.S. 549, 564 (1946).
42 Matthews v. Rodgers, 284 U.S. 521, 524-25 (1932).
43 Record, pp. 364, 369, 544, 562, WMCA, Inc. v. Simon, 208 F. Supp. 368 (S.D.N.Y.
1962).
44 Id. at 340.
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WMCA court the same evidence that it rejected when it was offered as proof."'
Actually, of the reapportionment cases decided to date, only Delaware,
New York, Alabama and possibly Oklahoma, have had what might be regarded
as full-scale hearings on the merits In Wisconsin, the court referred the issues
to a special master, before whom extensive hearings were held, and both written
and oral testimony was taken.4 7 An objective reading of the comprehensive
report of the special master shows that the evidence on which his findings of
fact and conclusions of law are based were all matters of which a court could
take judicial notice, or, at a minimum, material that properly could have been
brought to the attention of the court in a carefully prepared brief.
Still, there may be some advantage in having a full hearing in an apportion-
ment case. Justice Harlan, for instance, the solitary dissenter in the Georgia
unit rule case, Gray v. Sanders, lamented the lack of a full hearing on the merits.
Certainly, the Supreme Court should not be asked to pass upon momentous
constitutional issues on the basis of a partial or incomplete record. On the other
hand, malapportionment issues rarely involve complex issues of contested mate-
rial facts. In the writer's opinion, the one apparent advantage of a full trial
on the merits of a reapportionment case is the possibility that, as a consequence,
a court might be more disposed to find that the defendant election officials had
not adequately explained away the seemingly irrational and discriminatory
pattern of representation attacked in the suit. Also, since the record in a full
hearing might be somewhat more complete, or at ]east appear to be, both
trial courts and appellate courts might be, as a result, less chary about splashing
around in waters usually reserved for the legislatures.
2. Judicial Notice: A Convenient Crutch
As the three-judge federal court in the Alabama reapportionment case
put it:
We have no disposition to discourage the introduction of evidence
by any party, and in the ordinary case our opinion as to whether
the plaintiffs will be entitled to appropriate relief should await the
introduction of evidence. However, we take judicial notice of the
same facts which are well known to the . . . Supreme Court of
Alabama and to the people of this State....-Is
In the Georgia unit rule case, the trial court made liberal use of the doctrine
of judicial notice in concluding that the Georgia unit rule was invidiously dis-
45 A federal court, of course, will apply the requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Pro-
cedure 56, which prescribes the summary judgment procedure to be followed in federal courts.
Rule 56(e) requires affidavits in support of summary judgment to "set forth such facts as
would be admissible in evidence." However, most of the evidence that would be offered to
establish the existence of malapportioned representation is the type of which courts tradition-
ally have taken judicial notice. Accordingly, there seems little risk that an affidavit filed in an
apportionment case would be stricken on the grounds that the information it offers a court is
inadmissible evidence.
46 In Delaware, the trial took a week and consumed nearly 750 pages of transcript. Sin-
cock v. Duffy, 215 F. Supp. 169 (D. Del. 1963). However, after reading the record, I am
convinced that all the proof put in by the Delaware plaintiffs could have been put in evidence
either by affidavit or liberal use of the doctrine of judicial notice.
47 Wisconsin v. Zimmerman, 209 F. Supp. 183 (W.D. Wis. 1962).
48 Sims v. Frink, 205 F. Supp. 245, 247 (M.D. Ala. 1962).
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criminatory.4" I would encourage the reapportionment advocate to make max-
imum use of the helpful doctrine of judicial notice, whether in submitting proof
in document or affidavit form, or in arguing to the court in a trial memorandum
or appeal brief. Truly, there is no persuasive reason why all the material facts
in a reapportionment case cannot be put in the record through liberal but
perfectly acceptable use of the doctrine of judicial notice. Courts traditionally
have taken judicial notice of matters of common knowledge and experience.
Population figures, a critical item of proof in a reapportionment case, are,
beyond argument, statistics of which a court can take judicial notice. For
example, judicial notice was taken of population statistics furnished by the
United States Census Bureau in Tampa Electric Co. v. Nashville Coal Co."°
In other cases, courts have taken notice, not only of population statistics, but
even of the comparative population ratings among different areas,51 and the
rapidity of the expansion in population of a particular area.2
Important to a persuasive presentation of a reapportionment case may be
establishing that the urban and suburban areas, because of rural domination
of the legislature, are subjected to discrimination in respect to both taxes imposed
and revenues received back from the state for distribution among the local
political subdivisions. Statistics of this type, if properly presented, can be judicially
noticed,"' although, as pointed out above, a three-judge federal court in WMCA
v. Simon rejected an offer of proof of alleged discriminatory treatment with
respect to both taxation and revenue against the residents of the urban areas
of New York State.
It also has long been settled that courts may take judicial notice of common
matters of public history. 4 Even the mechanics of state legislative procedure
represent information or facts of which a court may properly take judicial
notice.5
The precedents are available, therefore, to sustain the advocate who invokes
judicial notice in attempting to place before the court important items of evidence
in a reapportionment case. Apart from the adverse rulings in the New York
case, the writer has discovered no authority with which to argue against liberal
use of the doctrine of judicial notice in a reapportionment case. The major areas
of inquiry pertain to statistics, projections and comparisons, both in respect to
population and to area, of the political subdivisions of a state, tax and revenue
figures, the legislative history of a state constitution or statute, and the public
history of the action, or, more usually, the inaction of a state legislature in
apportioning the representation provided in its chambers. These are all matters
49 Sanders v. Gray, 203 F. Supp. 158, 160 n.1 (N.D. Ga. 1962).
50 365 U.S. 320, 332 (1961). See In re B. P. Lientz Mfg. Co., 32 F. Supp. 233 (W.D. Mo.
1940).
51 NLRB v. Baltimore Transit 'Go., 140 F.2d 51 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 321 U.S. 795
(1944).
52 Rice & Co. v. United States, 100 F. Supp. 468 (W.D. Mo. 1951), aff'd, 342 U.S. 937(1952).
53 E.g., Hall v. St. Helena Parish School, 197 F. Supp. 649, 653 (E.D. La. 1961), aff'd,
368 U.S. 515 (1962), where the trial court took judicial notice that 97.1% of the operating
revenues of one parish were received from the State of Louisiana.
54 Blake v. United States, 103 U.S. 227 (1880); Rank v. Krug, 90 F. Supp. 773, 781-83
(S.D. Cal. 1950).
55 Griffin v. Sheldon, 11 Alaska 607, 78 F. Supp. 466 (D. Alaska 1948).
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of which a court properly can take judicial notice. They should be given every
opportunity to do so.
3. Paucity of State Legislative History Materials
In attempting to demonstrate a legislative purpose to discriminate against
urban and suburban areas in the enactment of apportionment legislation, or in
the refusal to change existing statutes so as to eliminate gross inequities in represen-
tation, there is a paucity of legislative history material available, and this may
present some problems. Usually, there are no written committee reports, pub-
lished hearings or debates on state legislation.5 6 Such information as can be
obtained from legislative journals, etc., may be useful for tracing the progress
of particular bills. Generally, however, they are of no help in determining the
legislative intent in their enactment or defeat. 57
Maryland is no exception to the general situation; the debates on the floor
of the General Assembly, committee reports and hearings are not published."
However, in Maryland Committee for Fair Representation v. Tawes, we were
able to circumvent this handicap by research in the "morgue" or back files of
Baltimore and Washington newspapers. More recent developments were kept
track of by extensive and careful clipping of the daily newspaper reports of the
doings of the legislature.
While the whole state may know that the legislature's motive in enacting
apportionment legislation, or failing to amend existing statutes on the subject,
was to effect a discrimination in representation, it may be difficult to interest
a court with this popularly accepted fact. Courts generally will not inquire into
motives which influence the legislature or its individual members in voting for
or against the passage of a statute."9 On the other hand, the long continuing
failure of a legislature to act has a significance which should not be ignored."0
Moreover, the Supreme Court has told us on more than one occasion that the
fourteenth amendment bars "ingenuous as well as ingenious discriminations."161
Legislative motives in enacting or in refusing to revise reapportionment laws
would not seem to be immune from judicial inquiry.
However, in New York, as previously noted, a three-judge federal court
was not interested in hearing evidence offered as to the discriminatory motive of
the New York legislature in enacting apportionment legislation for that state.
On the other hand, in another recent case, involving the claim of congressional
redistricting on the forbidden basis of race, another three-judge federal court
in the Southern District of New York held that the plaintiffs had failed to
offer any proof demonstrating a legislative motive to discriminate on racial
grounds in drawing the lines of congressional districts in New York City.62
Here also, the difficulty which seemingly confronts the apportionment ad-
56 See Finley, Book Review, 24 IND. L. J. 328 (1949).
57 See NEWMAN & SURREY, LEGISLATION 652 (1955).
58 Meyer, Legislative History and Maryland Statutory Construction, 6 MD. L. Rxv. 311
(1941).
59 See Helvering v. Griffiths, 318 U.S. 371 (1943).
60 T.I.M.E., Inc. v. United States, 359 U.S. 464 (1959).
61 Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 17 (1958); Smith v. Texas, 311 U.S. 128, 132 (1940).
62 Wright v. Rockefeller, 211 F. Supp. 460 (S.D.N.Y. 1962), prob. juris. noted, 31 U.S.L.
WEEK 3404 (U.S. June 10, 1963) (No. 950).
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vocate in presenting evidence of legislative motive is more imagined than real.
If the source materials are available, such as current or past newspaper reports,
magazine articles, official notes of a state constitutional convention, etc., little
ingenuity or effort is required to bring the information to the attention of
the court. If the doctrine of judicial notice is not flexible enough to
permit it, the even more liberal standards of effective brief writing provide the
means for demonstrating to a court the reasons for the failure of a state legis-
lature to reapportion. Long years of inaction are not without compelling signif-
icance in furnishing clues to legislative intention.63 The courts will listen to the
apportionment advocate who attempts to supply those clues, if indeed the
court does not already know them.
4. The Burden of Proof Problem
The burden of proof in a reapportionment case is on the plaintiff, who
starts with the proposition that courts will "accept as established such reasons
for the districting as are fairly conceivable or inferable in and from the results."'"
However, "there are limits to the extent of which the presumption of constitu-
tionality can be pressed." 5 The recent reapportionment decisions indicate that
once gross discrepancies of representation are established by appropriate popula-
tion statistics, the burden shifts to the defendant election officials to present
evidence to explain away the disproportions contained in the statutes.6 Accord-
ingly, while numerical inequality of voting strength does not necessarily prove
a deprivation of voting rights guaranteed by the Constitution, it may establish
a prima facie case for that proposition.
Under the circumstances, the apportionment advocate should play his
statistics to the limit. In establishing the inequities of representation that exist,
he should not only use present population figures but, to the extent possible,
project them to demonstrate that existing gross inequities in representation will
become even greater as the years pass and the suburban areas continue to
expand.67 He should single out and emphasize compelling statistics illustrating
some of the incredible inequalities in representation that may exist. A court
which hears that the vote of a resident of one district counts 33 times that
of a resident in another district must be moved. In the Georgia unit rule case
the Supreme Court listened somewhat incredulously, if not aghast, as counsel
for the appellees advised them in oral argument that 5.5 per cent of the popula-
tion controlled the Georgia Senate.6" Again, to argue, as petitioners did in the
Maryland case, that the senator from one large county is elected by more people
63 See United States v. Elgin, J. & E. R.R., 298 U.S. 492 (1936).
64 Mann v. Davis, 213 F. Supp. 577, 584 (E.D. Va. 1962).
65 Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 544 (1942).
66 E.g., Mann v. Davis, 213 F. Supp. 577 (E.D. Va. 1962); Moss v. Burkhart, 207 F.
Supp. 885, 891 (W.D. Okla. 1962). See Dixon, Apportionment Standards and Judicial Power,
infra at 367, 380.
67 See the amicus curiae brief submitted by Montgomery County, Maryland, in support of
the appeal to the Supreme Court of the United States in Md. Comm. for Fair Representation
v. Tawes, appeal filed, 31 U.S.L. WEEK 3173 (U.S. Oct. 24, 1962) (No. 554). There, popula-
tion projections are utilized to show that one of the grossly underrepresented suburban counties
was increasing in population each year by an amount larger than the existing population of
seven of the grossly overrepresented areas.
68 Abram, A New Civil Right, 52 NAT. Civsc REV. 186, 187 (1963).
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than are required to elect a majority of the entire state senate, is to attract the
judges' attention, if not their vote.
Remember also the clues which Justice Clark may have furnished in his
concurring opinion in Baker v. Carr,"' i.e., "legislative inactivity," "absence of
any other remedy," "crazy quilt" patterns of representation. With these in
mind, bring to the court's attention, either in proof or in argument: the dis-
crepancies even within the same class, i.e., rural or urban; the extent and
duration of legislative inaction; and the absence of the right of referendum or
initiative, if these are not available under the state constitution. If the latter
remedies are provided, develop the practical obstacles to effective resort to them
a4 a means of eliminating or substantially mitigating malapportionment in legis-
lative representation.
Despite the fact that the courts have not emphasized the point in the
apportionment decisions thus far, the attorney who finds himself in a reap-
portionment case would do well to emphasize such discriminations with respect
to state taxation and the return of state revenue to the local areas as he can
persuasively establish. For example, in the Maryland case, statistics furnished
by official agencies of the state were employed to show that as the result of
unfair statutory equalization formulae enacted by the rurally dominated General
Assembly, the suburban counties were severely discriminated against in the
amount of state revenue which was returned to the local political subdivisions.
Simce taxation without adequate representation may reach the point where due
process is offended, revenue and taxation evidence, although overshadowed by
the more compelling statistics regarding gross discrimination in voting strength,
should not be overlooked. Moreover, such adverse consequences tend to demon-
strate that discriminations in voting strength and legislative representation present
more than an abstract injustice.
Indeed, to the extent possible, the petitioners in a reapportionment case
should attempt to prove and to argue that discrimination to which they are
subjected in the exercise of voting strength has practical adverse consequences.
The petition for certiorari filed by the appealing Michigan election officials in
Scholle v. Hare, for example, makes a fairly compelling argument that the
appellees had made no showing that the malapportioned legislature "had failed
to adapt itself to modern urban problems."7 On the other hand, an amicus
curiae brief filed by the American Civil Liberties Union in the earlier case of
Magraw v. Donovan, 1 through an appendix attached thereto, made a con-
vincing showing of the practical consequences on city folk of rural domination
of the legislature.72
69 369 U.S. 186, 251 (1961).
70 Petition for cert. filed sub nom. Beadle v. Scholle, 31 U.S.L. WEEK 3147 (U.S. Oct. 15,
1962) (No. 517).
71 177 F. Supp. 803 (D. Minn. 1958).
72 Now that we suburban Marylanders are more alert to the problem, we are compiling an
interesting record of the stalemated government furnished by a General Assembly where the
lower house thereof is somewhat related to population, but where the state senate is based
solely on area (with one conspicuous exception). As a consequence, when Md. Comm. for Fair
Representation v. Tawes is argued before the United States Supreme Court, we will have
ready an illuminating appendix contrasting the action and inaction of a rurally dominated
Senate (14%1 elect a majority) to that of the House of Delegates, where 76% of the population
are at least given 55% of the representation.
NOTRE DAME LAWYER
An effort also should be made to allay the fears expressed by Justice Harlan
in his dissenting opinion in Gray v. Sanders that reasonable reapportionment
necessarily means domination by the "city" vote. As the newer statistics demon-
strate, the suburban areas are the victims of the grosser malapportionment. 3
Moreover, while urban and suburban interests in mass transportation and educa-
tion may coincide, as frequently as not the representatives from the cities may
oppose suburban demands for greater powers of taxation, zoning authority, etc.
Therefore, the advocate who has the time and the resources would be well
advised to provide the court with either statistics or arguments in order to
reassure it that reapportionment will not necessarily mean the substitution of
city rule for country rule.
CONCLUSION
The writer is reasonably certain that most of the suggestions or observations
contained in this paper have occurred, or will occur, to those of his colleagues
called upon to participate in a reapportionment suit. To the extent, however,
that they may furnish some short cuts in research, briefing or argument, this
paper will have been worth its effort.
All lawyers should take professional pride in the realization that the re-
apportionment battles in which they are engaged, or which they may be called
upon to join, represent primarily contests of law and advocacy. The basic
struggle is a constitutional debate in the grand tradition. To that encounter,
above all, lawyers should come particularly well equipped by training and ex-
perience. Their services are indispensable, for it is their professional skills which,
in substantial measure, will determine the outcome. I, for one, am not sure
what the ultimate achievements of the reapportionment crusade may turn out
to be. Unlike Professor Bickel, however, I refuse to believe that Baker v. Carr
may be regarded merely as an exercise in jurisdiction and justiciability, with no
real impact on substantive constitutional law.74 Perhaps the Solicitor General
of the United States was closer to the mark when he stated that he would not
be surprised if the Supreme Court "were ultimately to hold that if seats in one
branch of the legislature are apportioned in direct ratio to population, the
allocation of seats in the upper branch may recognize historical, political and
geographical subdivisions, provided that the departure from equal representation
in proportion to the population is not too extreme."" I would prefer, however,
to hope that Anthony Lewis, of the New York Times, will prove to be the more
accurate prophet. In commenting on the Georgia unit rule case and the "one
man, one vote" principle on which that decision rested, Lewis said, and I agree:
"Why should it be permissible to use the device of unequal legislative districts,
any more than the unit rule system, to give one man ten times the vote of
another?""6
73 DAVID & EISENBERG, STATE LEGISLATIVE REDISTRICTING 8 (1962).
74 Bickel, Durability of Colegrove v. Green, 72 YALE L.J. 39, 45 (1962).
75 Cox, Current Constitutional Issues, Address delivered before the Tennessee Bar Ass'n,
Nashville, Tenn., June 8, 1962; reprinted, 48 A.B.A.J. 711 (1962).
76 N.Y. Times (Western Ed.), March 21, 1963, p. 6.
PROBLEMS OF PERSUASION 429
Whatever the final answer, one can be sure that any renascence of the
principle of majority rule in the legislative chambers of the states will be, to a
considerable degree, the fruit of lawyers' dedication and advocates' skills. I am
sure that the final triumph, whatever its dimensions, will be forged on a case
by case basis, with the Supreme Court of the United States and the other
federal and state tribunals of the nation striking down those schemes of repre-
sentation which do not comply with the minimum requirements of equal
protection and due process. In that type of extended and litigious campaign,
lawyers are peculiarly well trained to participate and to persist.
I have been privileged to play some small part in the effort expended in
the Courts of Maryland, and am grateful for that opportunity. I hope that
many of my brethren will have a similar chance. I shall be gratified if anything
I have written here provides them with even slight assistance in carrying out
such assignments as may come their way.
